Between the 1840s and the 1930s, Peru and Chile exported hundreds of millions of tons of nitrogen-rich guano (dried bird excrement) and sodium nitrate (NaNO 3 ) to places as far-flung as California, Virginia, Prussia, Great Britain, and France. For farmers in North America and Europe, guano and sodium nitrate dramatically increased agricultural productivity during the final phase of the Industrial Revolution, which lasted from roughly the mid-1800s through World War I. 2 The widespread availability of imported fertilizers also facilitated a departure from organic "closed systems" of farming, in which nitrogen is cycled among soil, plants, animals, and people at the local scale, toward "open," energy-intensive approaches to agriculture that included additions of nitrogen from distant places. 3 This major human intervention in the nitrogen cycle was closely linked to fundamental shifts in global labor relations during the Age of Abolition (1780s-1880s). In 1807, Britain outlawed the importation of African slaves to its colonial empire. The following year, the United States banned the importation of slaves, while in 1811, Spain abolished chattel slavery at home and in all of its colonies except the "sugar islands" of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo. Despite such overwhelming victories for abolitionism, new forms of servitude emerged to replace those that faced extinction. Often these arrangements involved debt peonage, the repayment of loans with fixed periods of physical labor. 4 Prior to the full-scale mechanization of mineral extraction, companies in Peru and Chile met the demanding labor requirements of guano and sodium nitrate mining by exploiting workers who were neither chattel slaves nor wage laborers. The Peruvian government banned slavery in 1854, but offset potential labor shortages with la trata amarilla, the so-called "yellow trade" in coerced Chinese workers. Between 1847 and 1874, at least 100,000 "coolies" from China came to Peru aboard an estimated 276 vessels. While many of these laborers toiled on cotton and sugar plantations, worked as domestic servants, or built railroads, thousands performed the arduous task of digging seabird feces. Although employers promised to free coolies from the bonds of servitude after three to five years of work, such releases rarely occurred. 5 2 As Eric Hobsbawm has convincingly argued, the full effects of the Industrial Revolution "did not make themselves felt in an obvious and unmistakable way-at any rate outside England-until quite late in our period; certainly not before 1830, probably not before 1840 or thereabouts"; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789 -1848 (London, 1962 , 27. Others have used the term "second industrial revolution" to describe the period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in which such quintessentially "modern" technological devices as the telephone, the radio, the automobile, and the Chilean nitrate firms used a similarly coercive labor regime known as the enganche system. In the 1880s, recruiters for the Nitrate Producers Association began enlisting migrant workers in Chile, Bolivia, and Peru. Enganchadores, literally "ones who press or trick others into performing a service," hosted raucous, liquor-soaked carnivals where they enticed migrant laborers with tales of the boomtown fortunes to be made in the Norte Grande, the northernmost region of Chile. Once these men signed on, they found themselves at the mercy of company agents who routinely ignored contractual obligations. Debt for his passage to the mines became the interminable bond that kept each worker toiling endlessly for his contractor. 6 As a result, the First Green Revolution-from the 1840s to the 1930s-not only represented an unprecedented human intervention in the global nitrogen cycle, it also relied upon a new configuration of transnational labor relations. Debt peons from China, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and other regions of the Pacific world mined for the companies that exported nitrogen-rich compounds from South America's islands and deserts.
The fertilizer trade was instrumental in mobilizing new sources of nutrients and motivating innovative labor regimes. In an era in which modern technologies of movement, such as the train, the steamboat, and the steel-hulled clipper ship, began to compress the experience of space and time, capital rapidly exploited new zones of untapped resources. 7 Guano and sodium nitrate were valuable not merely because of their nitrogen content; they were prized because they could be transferred swiftly and inexpensively from South America's Pacific shores to the increasingly degraded soils of the Atlantic world. 8 In a similar display of rapid transnational displacement, employers moved workers from their homelands to distant job sites. These relocations facilitated unprecedented labor control for those who organized the trade in debt peons. Mining companies and plantation owners, faced with a post-slavery world order, used new word configurations of the long-distance labor trade to extract maximum surplus value from their workers, relegating millions of men and women to what Moon-Ho Jung calls "the legal and cultural borderland between slavery and freedom." 9 Through contractual agreements and their attendant promises of steady work and entrepreneurial potential, the coolie trade and the enganche system isolated laborers from familiar landscapes and made quitting impossible for debt peons. Gunther Peck's notion of "the geography of labor mobility" offers a conceptual framework for understanding how the labor power of these workers became commodified through spatial dislocation. As Peck demonstrates in Reinventing Free Labor, labor contractors in the late-nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century North American West created structures of coercion and established relations of debt peonage by controlling the traffic in workers across vast spaces and between jobs. 10 Like the labor conditions of the remote and inhospitable worksites that Peck profiles, guano extraction and nitrate mining were grueling jobs located in South America's most austere environments. Corporations that demanded regimented production schedules without seasonal relief had difficulty convincing small farmers to abandon their subsistence lifestyles and submit to new modes of capitalist work discipline. During the final phase of the Industrial Revolution, European and North American cash-crop production, from sugar beets to hops and cotton to tobacco, depended on an unprecedented acceleration of productivity from both a growing migrant labor force and thoroughly overworked soils.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, input-intensive agriculture developed rapidly as farmers on both sides of the Atlantic attempted to achieve higher crop yields. In many cases, such "open" systems of farming replaced local recycling of nutrients and the widespread use of long fallow periods of soil recovery characteristic of traditional agriculture. Such shifts constituted a prolonged phase of "restlessness" for both the earth and those who reshaped its contours; additionally, this global explosion of productivity depended on new substitutions for outdated labor regimes and obsolete land-use practices. 11 As a result, employers turned to debt peonage to solve the quandary of labor conscription in a geopolitical context where the African slave trade was increasingly outlawed. The hostile environments and the dangerous, backbreaking tasks of guano and sodium nitrate extraction magnified the unforgiving working conditions that itinerant miners faced, while the absence of institutional oversight in these remote mineral frontiers allowed the companies that profited from the lucrative fertilizer trade to use particularly coercive tactics. The global abolition of chattel slavery cre-9 Moon-Ho Jung, "Outlawing 'Coolies': Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of Emancipation," American Quarterly 57, no. ated new labor shortages on proto-industrial plantations and in mines, and an array of brutally innovative indenture arrangements emerged to meet capital's pressing demand for cheap labor. 12 By relocating workers to isolated landscapes, labor bosses undermined a traditional repertoire of political, economic, and social alternatives for these laborers. Thus, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the coerced migration of workers through debt peonage relations and the displacement of nutrients from the Pacific world toward the United States and Europe produced a double movement that revolutionized global agricultural production.
Despite its potential yields, the analytical terrain at the crossroads of environmental history and labor history has drawn the attention of few scholars. During the 1990s, Richard White urged his colleagues to reject "a larger tendency to define humans as being outside of nature," an approach that arises from a "disdain and distrust of those who most obviously work in nature." 13 White called for greater attention to the ways that humans have experienced "knowing nature through labor." 14 In 2008, Chad Montrie pushed White's argument further, encouraging scholars to think more concretely about how alienation from the products of our work produces estrangement from our environments. That same year, Thomas Andrews argued for heightened attentiveness to the processes that structure what he called "workscapes," places that are "shaped by the interplay of human labor and natural processes." 15 Such shifts in perspective require innovations in the conceptual structure of historical inquiry. The contours of ecosystems are notoriously evasive and rarely match the treaty-bound perimeters of nation-states; consequently, the study of human-ecological interactions through time necessitates a transnational viewpoint, even a transoceanic one. Writing history beyond national boundaries, in turn, generates new understandings of shifting labor practices and corresponding social transformations. Although Thomas Bender has become one of the most visible proponents of transnational history, younger scholars are supplementing his work with their own sophisticated critiques of nation-centered and comparative national histories. The hallmark of a transnational approach to the past, notes Micol Seigel, is that "Without losing sight of the 'potent forces' nations have become, it understands them as 'fragile, constructed, imagined.' Transnational history treats the nation as one among a range of social phenomena to be studied, rather than the frame of the study itself." 17 Unfortunately, debt peonage research has tended to reify the framework of the nation-state. Although scholars of slavery and abolition have described and analyzed types of bonded labor, such as sharecropping, that emerged as a "shadow of slavery" in the postbellum U.S. South, few juxtapose these manifestations of indenture in the southern United States with equally coercive labor arrangements beyond the Atlantic world after slavery's demise. 18 Similarly, while Latin American historians have explored relations of debt peonage in national contexts, they have yet to reflect upon the ways in which the combined arrangements of the Pacific coolie trade and the enganche system offered an alternative transnational labor regime to the increasingly fragmented nineteenth-century Atlantic slave trade. 19 THE KEY ELEMENT OF THESE TRANSFORMATIONS was nitrogen, one of several macronutrients-including phosphorus and potassium-that plants need for survival. Nitrogen is a building block of nucleic acids, proteins, chlorophyll, and enzymes. The earth's atmosphere is composed of approximately 79 percent triple-bonded nitrogen gas (N 2 ), while the remaining 21 percent is oxygen, along with trace amounts of other gases. Despite the ubiquity of gaseous nitrogen, only a small percentage of this atmospheric supply is readily available to terrestrial organisms. Atmospheric N 2 is highly unreactive; most plants cannot use this nitrogen unless it is transformed into reactive (N r ) forms, including ammonium (NH 4 ) and nitrate (NO 3 ). One of the few pathways through which atmospheric nitrogen becomes usable to plants is biofixation, or the conversion of inert N 2 into organic compounds, such as amino acids, which are further transformed by microbes to produce NH 4 and NO 3 . Biofixation can be carried out by Rhizobium bacteria attached to the roots of leguminous plants, including soybeans and clover, or by other free-living microbes, such as cyanobacteria. Lightning, volcanic activity, and forest fires, as well as high-temperature combustion of fossil fuels, can also produce the extreme temperatures necessary for the fixation of nitrogen. Additionally, the recycling of crop residues, manures, or human waste can help to preserve the pool of reactive nitrogen within an ecosystem. 21 In the millennia following the Neolithic Revolution (ca. 10,000 B.C.E.), most agrarian societies began recycling human and animal waste. The Roman writer Lucius Columella (4 -70 C.E.) urged farmers to "bring as food for newly ploughed fallow ground whatever stuff the privy vomits from its filthy sewers." Almost two millennia later, a Chinese imperial treatise from 1737 commented, "The southerners accumulate nightsoil in pits. They treasure nightsoil as if it were gold." Nutrient-rich manures even altered relations between pastoralists and sedentary peoples. ample, in precolonial East Africa, manure from the cattle raised by Hinda clans fertilized the banana crops grown by neighboring Haya cultivators. 22 Farmers around the world also discovered the value of cultivating nitrogen-fixing legumes, such as alfalfa, clover, peanuts, beans, peas, and lentils. As early as the fourth century B.C.E., Xenophon of Athens remarked that legume cultivation was a successful remedy for soil exhaustion. Likewise, the ancient Chinese ideogram "shu," which represented the soybean, had a row of vertical marks at its base to denote the relationship between the plant's root nodules and its soil-enhancing properties. 23 In the Americas, legumes featured prominently in the foodways of ancient civilizations. Archaeologists digging among prehistoric ruins in Peru unearthed so many peanut shells that they joked that the site "bore a strong resemblance to the main entry of Yankee Stadium after a Saturday game." 24 During the nineteenth century, European and North American farmers began to abandon closed systems of nutrient recycling, which had connected neighboring urban and rural communities. Previously, poudrette (human excrement, dried and mixed with charcoal and gypsum), furnace ashes, ground bone, and dried blood from slaughterhouses had provided urban contributions to rural soil fertility. In return, city dwellers had consumed the produce of nearby farms. By the mid-1800s, openended systems arose, which depended on foreign commodities, including imported seeds, machinery, and fertilizers. These inputs often traveled great distances to reach the farms where they were applied. 25 In 1857, Karl Marx summarized this transition: "agriculture no longer finds the natural conditions of its own production within itself, naturally arisen, spontaneous, and ready to hand, but these exist as an independent industry separate from it." 26 Guano and sodium nitrate were products of such an independent industry, and their widespread availability contributed to the emerging metabolic rift between the city and the countryside. The development of input-intensive agriculture was neither instantaneous nor inevitable. Regions of Europe and North America shifted away from tight nutrient-cycling loops between urban and rural communities at different times and with varying degrees of resistance. 27 A handful of social reformers lamented this partition, begging their fellow citizens to bridge the expanding chasm between city and farm. In his 1862 novel Les Misérables, Victor Hugo wrote, "There is no guano comparable in fertility with the detritus of a capital. A great city is the most mighty of dung-makers. Certain success would attend the experiment of employing the city to manure the plain. If our gold is manure, our manure, on the other hand, is gold." 28 Twelve years later, a California writer compared the nutrient-cycling failures of his own city to those of Hugo's Paris: "Is it possible that San Francisco possesses no man of sufficient business far-sight to see that he might accumulate a mint of wealth by paying the city a round sum for the contents of its privy-vaults and sewers, and handling it on the suburban sand hills, and with it flooding the country with early vegetables?" 29 For the most part, however, such enterprising suggestions fell upon deaf ears.
A revolution in soil science, resulting in the development of manufactured fertilizers, hastened this evolving metabolic rift between the city and the country. 30 Prior to the mid-1800s, farmers, blacksmiths, and estate owners, lacking formal scientific training, developed what Steven Stoll has aptly labeled "dunghill doctrines." 31 These advances in European and North American agriculture contributed to prevailing understandings of soil dynamics and coalesced as commitments to the continued fertility of the land. In 1840, however, when German chemist Justus von Liebig published his groundbreaking treatise on fertilizer and soils, Organic Chemistry in Its 27 Karl Marx frequently used the German term Stoffwechsel, or metabolism, when discussing productive relations between humans and nature. In his analysis of the rise of industrial agriculture, he built upon Justus von Liebig's pioneering soil science (see nn. 32 and 33) and introduced the notion of "an irreparable rift in the interdependent processes of social metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The result of this is a squandering of the vitality of the soil, which is carried by trade far beyond the bounds of a single country. Applications to Agriculture and Physiology, he ushered in an era of scientific farming. As Liebig contended, "It must be admitted as a principle of agriculture, that those substances which have been removed from a soil must be completely restored to it . . . A time will come when the fields will be manured with a solution of glass (silicate of potash), with the ashes of burnt straw, and with salts of phosphoric acid, prepared in chemical manufactories, exactly as present medicines are given for fever and goiter." 32 If soil exhaustion was the ailment, Liebig's remedy was neither cow dung nor clover, but rather a potent manufactured combination of chemical fertilizers. 33 One year after Liebig's monumental work appeared, French scientist Alexandre Cochet published the results of his experiments on guano from the Chincha Islands. The Chinchas, three granite islands located 13 miles (21 kilometers) off the southwest coast of Peru, were covered in guano from the Guanay cormorant (Phalacrocorax bougainvillii ), the Peruvian booby (Sula variegate), and the Peruvian brown pelican (Pelicanus occidentalis thagus), which feed on the anchovetas (Engraulis ringens) and Pacific sardines (Sardinops sagax) that thrive in the cold, nutrient-rich waters of the Humboldt Current. Because the Peruvian coast is among the driest places on earth, there was rarely enough rainfall to dissolve the accumulated excrement. Over many millennia, these chalky deposits became fossilized storehouses of nitrogen, phosphates, and alkaline salts. 34 Centuries before Francisco Pizarro's conquest of Peru (1531-1533), the Quechua-speaking farmers of the region had raised the yields of their coastal maize crops with regular applications of guano. In his 1609 Comentarios reales de los Incas, Garcilaso Inca de la Vega recalled, "On the sea coast, from below Arequipa to Tarapaca, a distance of more than two hundred leagues, they use no other manure than the droppings of sea birds, of which there are large and small along all the coast, and they fly in such enormous flocks that it would be incredible to any one who had not seen them. They breed on certain desert islands on the coast, and the quantity they make is also incredible. From a distance these heaps of manure look like the peaks 32 It was not until Prussian naturalist Alexander von Humboldt spent the years from 1799 to 1804 in the Americas that Europe's chemists and agronomists took notice of Pacific Coast fertilizers. In 1802, while visiting the Peruvian port city of Callao, Humboldt (after whom the northwesterly Pacific current takes its name) explored guano's growth-promoting properties. Upon his return to Europe, he shared his findings with his colleagues and sparked a new interest in the Peruvian product. By the 1820s, North American agricultural journals were informing their readers of Peru's soil-enhancing bird dung. 36 Like Humboldt, French mining engineer Jean Baptiste Boussingault traveled extensively throughout South America, living there for more than a decade. He visited Peru's northern harbor of Paita in 1832 and remarked, "Along a great extent of the coast of Peru, the soil, which is perfectly barren of itself is rendered fertile, and is made to yield abundant crops, by the application of guano." 37 Once soil scientists endorsed guano, the next step for eager commercial interests was to organize the means of extracting the foul-smelling product for export from the Pacific coast to Atlantic ports.
THOUSANDS OF CHINESE DEBT PEONS, known colloquially as colonos asiáticos (Asian settlers), undertook the task of digging seabird feces. In the 1840s, capitalists and their state sponsors began relying on the coolie trade for cheap, unskilled labor. British imperial officials orchestrated the sea change from the transatlantic slave trade to the transpacific traffic in debt peons. Nominally, Chinese migration followed the imperatives of "free labor," or contractual wage work with the "freedom" to quit. British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell underscored this notion. On July 11, 1860, he contended that his country's encouragement of the coolie trade represented a decisive stand for abolitionism and free labor: "Her Majesty's government, therefore proposes, with a view to the final extinction of the Slave Trade . . . a plan of emigration from China regulated by agents of the European nations in conjunction with the Chinese authorities." 38 "Vessels, it appears, are equipped for the business upon the model of slave ships," explained a New York Daily Times correspondent in 1853 when describing the ships transporting Chinese workers to Peru. "The victims-men, and even children-are kidnapped. They are crowded down between low decks, where any other than a prone or sitting posture is out of the question." 40 One in every ten of these men and boys died during the grueling journey, while those who survived ended up on Peru's coastal plantations or spent countless years shoveling guano. 41 Guano excavation ranked among the world's deadliest and least remunerative jobs. Contractors demanded that each worker mine a quota of four tons per day for the meager wage of three reales, or seven pesos, per month. 42 As an English observer was appalled to find, "During the last quarter of 1875, it is reported that there were 355 Chinamen employed [on one of the Chincha Islands], of whom no less than 98 were in the hospital. The general sickness is swelled legs, caused, it is supposed, by drinking condensed water not sufficiently cooled, and by a lack of vegetable diet." 43 In addition, the ammonia-laden guano dust triggered devastating ailments in the lungs of those who constantly breathed the foul-smelling, acrid powder. Such horrendous conditions led to drastic measures; suicide among guano workers was so common that notices of its occurrence appeared regularly in El Commercio and El Nacional, Peru's leading nineteenth-century newspapers. 44 Guano mining was rarely mechanized. As of 1853, two steam shovels operated on the north island of the Chinchas, but manual labor persisted. 45 George Wash- Through these the guano is conducted into launches, or directly into the holds of vessels loading." 46 On the receiving end, deckhands risked being sucked into the avalanche of powder. As a Yankee captain related to the Providence Journal, "Cases have occurred where men have slipped in at the mouth of the hose as the guano went in or down, and were never seen again, or dead, if found at all." 47 Burial at sea had never implied such a dreadful fate.
As ships laden with guano departed the Chinchas, boats crammed with Chinese laborers arrived to replace deceased or terminally ill miners. The coolie trade between China and Peru was big business. Recognizing this, the leading inter-American shipping house of W. R. Grace and Company sought to expand its enterprises by transporting debt peons. William Russell Grace wrote to his brother Michael in the early 1870s, "There is lots of money in the business. 600 men in China costs [ 48 This lucrative trade in human cargoes centered on Macao, where Portuguese merchants organized the recruitment process that bound coolies to employers across the Pacific. Crimping and kidnapping were common means of supplementing more formal contractual arrangements, and many coolies found themselves "inveigled to the islands . . . under specious promises." 49 The number of coolies who made up the guano labor force is notoriously difficult to ascertain. During the early 1840s, Peruvian convicts and army deserters supplied most of the labor for guano extraction, but in October 1849, the first Chinese workers arrived aboard the Danish ship Frederick William. An account from 1853 registered 1,000 miners, most of them from China, toiling on the Chinchas. Initially, two plantation owners, Domingo Eliás and Juan Rodríguez, held exclusive government licenses for the introduction of coolies to the guano mines and coastal farms of Peru. Under their control, conditions remained abominable. A visitor to the islands wrote in 1853, "The Chinese work almost naked under a tropical sun where it never rains. They are slender figures and do not look strong." 50 Abuses proved so outrageous that an international outcry prompted the Peruvian government to suspend the coolie trade in 1856. The government then reopened it in 1861. Finally, on July 26, 1874, representatives of the Chinese and Peruvian governments signed the Tratado de paz, amistad, comercio y navegación [Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation], which promoted Chinese commercial activities in Peru and encouraged movement of the labor trade away from guano digging and plantation labor and toward mainland mining operations and railroad work. All told, as many as 10,000 Chinese coolies may have dug guano on the Chincha Islands during the mid-1800s. 51 The Chinese bound for Peru resisted the cruel strictures of debt peonage, refusing to wait for long-overdue government assistance from imperial officials in distant Beijing. Resistance often took the form of rebellion during the Pacific crossing.
As Basil Lubbock remarked, "a rising of the coolies was the one terror that ever stalked behind the captain of a Chinese coolie ship. In order to prevent the ships from being captured by their passengers, the decks and hatchway openings were barred and barricaded like the old convict ships." 52 Attempts at physical confinement proved unsuccessful; no fewer than sixty-eight coolie ships experienced mutinies between 1847 and 1874. 53 For guano merchants, however, lucrative ends justified horrifying means. Between 1840 and 1878, Peruvian guano exports surpassed 12.6 million metric tons (see Figure 2) , garnering $750 million. Monetary sums of this magnitude were rare in the nineteenth century; justifiably, this period was known as Peru's "Guano Era." 54 Few Peruvians benefited from the guano trade, however. Under the "consignment system," their government auctioned off the extraction rights and marketing privileges to private mercantile houses in exchange for loans based on future profits. The British companies W. J. Meyers of Liverpool and Anthony Gibbs & Sons of London dominated the guano trade in the mid-1800s. A popular London rhyme of the period went: "The House of Gibbs made their dibs selling the turds of foreign birds." 55 Guano profits financed the construction of lavish British estates, including the Gothic Revival mansion of Tyntesfield in North Somerset near Bristol. 56 Between 1841 and 1857, Britain imported 2.4 million metric tons of guano, which farmers used to fertilize crops of wheat, hops, and turnips. By 1846, the editors of the Journal of Agriculture commented, "Guano is now so well known as an excellent promoter of green crops, that its use may be said to be firmly established in the husbandry of this country." 57 These nutrient-rich infusions produced wondrous results. British parliamentarian and agricultural journalist Chandos Wren Hoskyns praised guano as "The Wizard of the Pacific," while the Scottish writer William Wallace Fyfe contended in 1859, "Guano is, probably, the animal manure most justly 52 in vogue in agriculture." 58 Unlike calcareous fertilizers, such as lime, gypsum, and marl, Peruvian bird excrement possessed the natural advantage of smelling like cow manure, which made it more acceptable to farmers. One British agriculturalist even recommended tasting it for definitive proof of this similitude. 59 British merchants also sold Peruvian guano to other nations, helping French and Prussian sugar beet farmers ease European dependence on Caribbean sugarcane imports. By 1860, Prussia switched from being a net sugar importer to being a net sugar exporter. 60 As a high-ranking Prussian Ministry of Agriculture official recalled, the mid-nineteenth century "was a time in which we believed that there was no limit to the increase of [sugar beet] yields thanks to the ever growing availability of cheap commercial fertilizers." 61 experimentation with Peruvian guano, and Dutch imports of the South American fertilizer grew by at least 7,000 metric tons per year during the period from 1865 to 1874. 62 IN THE UNITED STATES, PERUVIAN GUANO came to symbolize progressive agricultural practices. Its fertilizing prowess received glowing endorsements from leading agricultural journals of the day, including the Farmers' Register, the Southern Cultivator, and the Farmer's Journal. In 1853, a North Carolina farmer told the Farmer's Journal that "There are many rich fields in many parts of the country, which but for guano would have still been barren, failing to produce enough to pay the owner for their cultivation." The Peruvian fertilizer fueled bumper harvests of tobacco and cotton across the South. 63 Because of guano's recognized effectiveness, its price rose dramatically in the United States after it was first used in the 1840s. In 1843, a shipload of guano arrived in Baltimore and fetched $.07 a ton. Seven years later, the price hit $76 per ton, eventually leveling out at $50 per ton. Between 1860 and 1880, farmers throughout North and South Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, and Virginia expended a combined sum of $14,094,000 on commercial fertilizer. 64 High guano prices triggered anxiety among the cultivators who opted to invest in fertilizer supplements. American farmers soon began insisting that the federal government break Peru's "guano monopoly." 65 President Millard Fillmore made guano acquisition a central foreign policy concern. In his first annual message, delivered on December 2, 1850, he announced, "Peruvian guano has become so de-sirable an article to the agricultural interest of the United States that it is the duty of the Government to employ all means properly in its power for the purpose of causing that article to be imported into the country at a reasonable price. Nothing will be omitted on my part toward accomplishing this desirable end." 66 The passage of the Guano Islands Act of 1856, which legalized the private appropriation of unclaimed guano islands in the name of the United States, signaled the urgency with which legislators pursued the procurement of organic fertilizer: "Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other Government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other Government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States." 67 Yet such far-reaching mandates proved superfluous. During the late 1870s, as Peru's guano supplies began to dwindle, excitement shifted to the fertilizing potential of sodium nitrate. 68 In 1877, the Saturday Evening Post published a story titled "Immense Nitre Deposits, Which Will Prove of More Value Than Guano." 69 That same year, the editors of the Atlanta farm journal Southern Cultivator wrote of nitrate of soda, "Few fertilizers act so rapidly when judiciously applied." 70 Professor Mason Graham Ellzey of the Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College wrote to Baltimore's American Farmer to recommend that farmers use nitrate of soda because "Wheat following corn, or even tobacco, must have artificial supplies of nitrogen, or a maximum crop cannot be made. The feeding of stock on the field for a few months before the corn is planted, gives the land some nitrogen, but certainly much less than is provided in 100 lbs. per acre of nitrate of soda and less than is removed by the corn." 71 One reason for the popularity of sodium nitrate fertilizer was that it dis-solved easily in water, making its nitrogen readily available to plant roots shortly after application. 72 UNTIL 1879, THE NITRATE TRADE involved Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. During the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Chile defeated the allied forces of Peru and Bolivia. With the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, Chile acquired the provinces of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. Additionally, Bolivia forfeited its coastal access when it ceded the Pacific seaport of Antofagasta to Chile in 1884. Thus, Chile won exclusive control over the valuable nitrate mines in the northern Atacama Desert, which extended 400 miles (644 kilometers) from north to south. 73 In the parched sands of the Atacama, a crucial element of life abounded. Sodium nitrate (salitre) contains approximately 16 percent nitrogen and 27 percent sodium. Nearly all of the mined sodium nitrate in the world originates from deposits in the deserts of northwestern South America, where it occurs in a mixture with other salts, such as potassium nitrate, and assorted trace metals, iodine, and insoluble compounds. The most nitrogen-rich form of extractable nitrate is known as caliche, a calcite-bound layer of rock found beneath several meters of gravel and powdered composites. Miners (calicheros) worked for nitrate refineries (oficinas), which were owned by wealthy Chilean salitreros and financed by British and American capital.
Among the most notorious captains of industry to operate in the nitrate fields was John Thomas North, an enigmatic English mechanic who began working in the salitre oficinas in 1871. A dozen years later, he had become the undisputed "Nitrate King," having built his fortune by supplying the parched port city of Iquique with fresh water and then using the profits from this enterprise, along with financing from a Liverpool-based merchant house, to purchase nitrate companies and railways. As one of North's detractors, the Financial News, quipped in 1888, "He was heard lamenting there were not more elements in nature than air, earth and water, as they were such nice things to finance." 74 North's control of the nitrate trade was overwhelming in its scope. The flamboyant entrepreneur was either the founder or the co-founder of seventeen of the twenty-three British companies involved in the Chilean nitrate trade in 1890; thus he controlled 71 percent of an industry listed by the London Stock Exchange at a total nominal capital of £10,000,000. 75 Such colossal sums represented the value extracted from years of backbreaking labor performed by Chilean, Peruvian, and Bolivian debt peons. After dislodging the caliche with dynamite, these workers ground it and exposed it to hot water. Using a technique called the Shanks refining process, they induced crystallization of the sodium nitrate; they then bagged the final product and sent it to coastal ports by rail. 76 Between the 1880s and the 1930s, nitrate companies recruited miners through the enganche system, which involved the transportation of workers en masse to distant project sites. Prior to departure, landless peasants signed contracts, which guaranteed them a small cash advance, a wage paid in company scrip, housing, and supplies. However, this covenant also bound them to the repayment of a huge debt for their passage. Unlike the Chinese coolies who labored as single men on a bachelor frontier, many nitrate miners brought their wives and children with them to the arid landscape, where they lived in shantytowns that lacked sewers and running water. Members of these migrant families worked twelve-hour shifts under the scorching desert sun and received their pay in fichas, a form of scrip redeemable only at company-run stores. As a result, they had every reason to harbor bitterness toward their employers. 77 Given such glaring class antagonisms, it is not surprising that the Atacama became a crucible of labor militancy at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the winter of 1907, 20,000 striking nitrate miners descended on Iquique, the coastal terminus of the Nitrate Railways, to demand higher wages from the powerful producers' association, the Combinación Salitrera. The Combinación refused to engage in collective bargaining with the workers, and Chilean president Pedro Montt ordered the strikers to disperse. The miners refused to disband. On December 21, government troops opened fire, killing several thousand unarmed men, women, and children who had gathered at the Santa María School. The legacy of 1907 has not been forgotten; in fact, many activists and historians consider the massacre to be the formative moment of Chile's labor movement. Long before the Santa María massacre, the lavish lifestyles of the foreigners who ran operations in the Norte Grande had provoked working-class resentment. In Iquique, nineteenth-century travel writer Marie Robinson Wright found "clubs for gentlemen, the English Club having on its roll of membership names distinguished in the financial circles of Europe as well as America. A broad driveway along the beach connects the city with its suburb, Cavancha, a delightful resort with a dancing pavilion and promenade. A little flower garden, tended with as much solicitude as if it were a casket of jewels, gives a charming touch of natural color." 79 Exhibitions of upper-class opulence within a seemingly barren landscape were among the arresting ironies sustained by the nitrate regions. 80 A visitor from the United States emphasized another blatant contradiction of the spatial displacements involved in the fertilizer trade: "Foodstuffs for man and beast must be imported to the nitrate region. This food problem, therefore, develops into an enormous business and might be called one of the ironies of commerce-foodstuffs on a large scale entering a country in order that food-growing materials may be sent out of a country." 81 Few examples more clearly demonstrate the global nature of the metabolic rift in modern agriculture.
Scientific experts exacerbated this split. In 1898, Sir William Crookes, president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, stated that soil exhaustion had produced a situation in which "All England and all civilized nations stand in deadly peril of not having enough to eat." 82 Wright explained, "In suggesting a remedy, Professor Crookes recommended the use of nitrate of soda, this product forming, according to his judgment, the cheapest and most important natural source from which to derive the supplies of nitrogen necessary for the restoration of the soil." 83 Germany imported 55,000 metric tons of Chilean sodium nitrate in 1880 and achieved an average wheat output of 19 bushels per acre. In 1913, 747,000 metric tons were imported, increasing the average yield to 35 bushels per acre. That year alone, Chile exported 2.75 million metric tons of sodium nitrate. 84 As the nitrate trade developed, it generated an increasingly complex global division of labor. Sodium nitrate shipping was one of the last enterprises to depend upon wind-powered transportation. Rival German and French builders, such as Fritz Laeisz of Hamburg and Antoine Dominique Bordes of Bordeaux, employed tens of thousands of shipyard workers in the construction of hulking five-mast, iron-and steel-hulled clipper ships, designed to carry massive cargoes of salitre. 85 Additionally, by the 1920s, Chile was spending more than U.S. $5,000,000 each year on jute sacks from the Bengali region in present-day Bangladesh. 86 IN THE UNITED STATES, SODIUM NITRATE made its most durable contribution to a sundrenched region in Southern California. Known as the "Inland Empire," Riverside and San Bernardino Counties became a hub of railroad commerce and a hotbed of citrus cultivation by the early 1900s. In 1890, journalist Charles Dudley Warner found that "[The city of] Riverside may without prejudice be regarded as the centre of the orange growth and trade. The railway shipments of oranges from Southern California in the season of 1890 aggregated about 2400 car-loads, or about 800,000 boxes, of oranges . . . valued at about $1,500,000." 87 The two major varieties that filled these wooden crates were the Valencia orange and the so-called "King of Oranges," the Washington navel. British nurseryman Thomas Rivers sent Valencias from the Azores to his London greenhouses in the mid-1860s. From this stock, lawyer Alfred B. Chapman took cuttings to his estate near Los Angeles. William Saunders of the Department of Agriculture brought Washington navel oranges to the United States from Bahia, Brazil, in 1870. He planted them in Washington, D.C., and sent two specimens to Eliza Tibbets for cultivation at her new home in Riverside, California. Tibbets planted and nurtured the trees, which eventually became the source of budwood for the fledgling orange industry. 88 Once these new cultivars took root, vast estates emerged. Archduke Ludwig Salvator of Austria saw some of these large operations when he visited Los Angeles in the winter of 1876. After touring the San Gabriel Valley by carriage, Salvator described the 1,300-acre estate of Lake Vineyard and the 500-acre estate of Mount Vineyard: "Both groves produced this year more than 1,000,000 oranges and 75,000 beet production, see J. R. Brown, "Nitrate Crises, Combinations, and the Chilean Government in the Nitrate Age," Hispanic American Historical Review 43, no. 2 (1963): 230-246, here 231. 85 For more on these vessels, see Basil Lubbock, The Nitrate Clippers (Glasgow, 1932) . 86 In order to protect the fledgling domestic jute industry, the Chilean government placed a duty on the re-importation of these sacks. Clarence F. Jones, "Chilean Commerce," Economic Geography 3, no. lemons, as well as limes, olives, and walnuts." 89 Between 1880 and 1890, the number of orange trees in California increased from 1,250,000 to 3,378,000. 90 Nitrogen deficiencies afflicted the arid regions where orange growers operated intensive irrigation systems and where a dearth of cover crops and grazing animals made legumes and manures scarce. Chilean sodium nitrate offered a convenient remedy. In 1900, one orange grower told the California State Board of Horticulture, "I bought and applied in the fall Chile saltpetre, a small amount per tree, with the evident result that I had more puffy fruit than I ever had before up to that date. I saw evident result, as the orange-growers who used it in Los Angeles County had the same experience." 91 By the mid-1920s, farmers on the Pacific Coast were applying far more Chilean sodium nitrate than their counterparts elsewhere in the United States. In 1934, the Los Angeles Times pointed out, "No other fruit crop in California is fertilized so heavily as are the citrus groves. Annual fertilizer expenditures of $60 per acre are common and they may be as great as $150 per acre." 92 This logic characterized the nexus of cash crop cultivation and the exotic inputs upon which it relied. 93 It also brought fruit production into the world of commodities and their equivalencies. The Los Angeles Times quoted well-known horticulturalist Liberty Hyde Bailey, who had determined the amount of sodium nitrate leaving California's farms in each orange: "Figuring the percentage of nitre in each orange grown in California, Prof. Bailey estimated that there was shipped from this State last year 50,000 tons of nitre in the form of oranges." 94 Despite the usefulness of his calculations, Bailey did not quantify the years of hardship represented in each delicious fruit.
In California, as elsewhere, the First Green Revolution was linked to new labor systems and extraordinary migrations of workers. In 1939, Carey McWilliams suggested that the Golden State's bountiful harvests depended upon the wholesale exploitation of migrant Asian and Latino farmworkers, who "eke out a miserable existence, intimidated by their employers, homeless, starving, destitute. Today they are restless but quiet; tomorrow they may be rebellious." 95 While the picture was more complicated than McWilliams suggested, his account was among the first to reveal the hidden expropriations that underwrote California's agricultural expansion. In the years that followed, these "factories in the field" expanded eastward from the Pacific Coast into North America's heartland. The Bracero Program (1942 Program ( -1964 orchestrated the legally sanctioned migration of 4.6 million Mexican farmworkers to the United States. 96 Like their predecessors in the coolie trade and the enganche system, these laborers worked far from home as a non-citizen underclass. Braceros and their families faced an array of challenges, including poverty wages, poor working conditions, widespread social discrimination, and a persistent shortage of social services. U.S. Labor Department official Lee Williams, who supervised the Bracero Program during its last five years, referred to it as "legalized slavery." 97 In addition to creating an urgent problem of new seasonal labor demands, such intensifications in production required constant attentiveness to the issue of soil degradation. During the interwar years, fears of nitrate shortages caused a U.S. Department of Commerce official to assert, "The Chilean nitrate industry is a striking example of the control of a raw material by the producers thereof." 98 The "guano monopoly" was now the "nitrate monopoly." Prior to World War II, Chilean sodium nitrate accounted for 50 percent of the nitrogen used in U.S. commercial fertilizer, while globally, Chilean nitrates constituted approximately 60 percent of commercially traded nitrogen sources between 1870 and 1913. Between 1875 and 1929, Chile exported nearly 80 million metric tons of sodium nitrate. 99 Chicago Tribune publisher William D. Boyce was on to something when he wrote on July 23, 1911, "We Americans point with becoming pride to our great western prairies of rolling wheat lands and luxurious tracts of alfalfa and orchard country, but I think that but few of us know how much we are indebted to the nitrate workings of northern Chile." 100 By the onset of World War I, humans had fundamentally altered the nitrogen cycle once again. On July 3, 1909, German chemist Fritz Haber informed the directors of the chemical firm Badische Anilin-und Soda-Fabrik (BASF) in Ludwigshafen, "Yesterday we began operating the large ammonia apparatus with gas circulation . . . for about five hours without interruption. During this whole time it functioned correctly and produced liquid ammonia continuously." 101 Using temper- atures between 450°C and 600°C, high pressures (200 to 400 atmospheres), and an enriched iron catalyst, Haber produced a reaction of nitrogen and hydrogen that generated ammonia (NH 3 ). Chemical engineer Carl Bosch standardized the process, allowing BASF to begin commercial ammonia production in 1913. The significance of this development to increased global food production cannot be overstated. As Vaclav Smil wrote in the year 2000, "at least four out of every five children born during the next half a century in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East will synthesize their body proteins from nitrogen fixed by the Haber-Bosch synthesis of ammonia." 102 Ironically, this technology that provided the building blocks for life also offered the basis for taking it away. Nitrogen supplies would be a central concern, not only as fertilizer to feed domestic populations, but as a key ingredient of the gunpowder that sustained the fighting in World War I. Manufacturers produced blasting powders with a mixture of saltpeter (either potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate), charcoal, and sulfur. As of 1900, half of the sodium nitrate ( Chilean coast looked as though it might shorten the war's duration, but German chemical plants at Oppau and Leuna synthesized enough ammonia to keep their nation's war machine running until its defeat in November 1918. By the mid-1930s, industrial ammonia synthesis had become the dominant source of fixed nitrogen in Europe and the United States. 103 At the conclusion of World War II, stockpiles of unused nitrogen, awaiting shipment to explosives factories, lay idle. As this nitrogen flooded the market, it caused a drop in fertilizer prices. Farmers in the United States and Europe applied this inexpensive supplement to their crops, causing traditional varieties of wheat and rice to develop taller stems with heavier grains. In wind and rain, these top-heavy plants frequently collapsed. By the 1940s, plant breeder Norman Borlaug and his colleagues were developing semi-dwarf plants with shorter, stronger stalks that could carry the weight of these new nitrogen-rich seed heads. Altering botanical architecture through selective breeding, they produced a "yield blast-off." 104 In 1963, retired USDA scientist Henry M. Beachell discovered a quick-maturing dwarf rice variety, called IR-8, which offered similar benefits to those of Borlaug's semi-dwarf wheat strains. Addressing the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize Committee in Oslo, Norway, Borlaug employed a heady kinetic analogy: "If the high-yielding dwarf wheat and rice varieties are the catalysts that have ignited the Green Revolution, then chemical fertilizer is the fuel that has powered its forward thrust." 105 As a result of these developments, average global cereal yields tripled during the second half of the twentieth century. In 1950, the world's farmers grew 631 million tons of grain; in 2000, they harvested 1,840 million tons. Despite the fact that the earth's population more than doubled during the second half of the twentieth century, per capita grain production increased 28 percent over this fifty-year period. Many pundits and policymakers refer to this extraordinary upsurge in staple food production as "the miracle of the Green Revolution." 106 Yet these nitrogen-propelled yield increases came with enormous costs. The implementation of capital-intensive Green Revolution policies encouraged widespread dependence upon chemically intensive monoculture, in which farmers cultivate a single species to the exclusion of all other plants. The limited genetic variability of such drastically simplified systems makes them unusually susceptible to disease. Also, small-scale farmers in Asia, Latin America, and Africa have found it difficultif not impossible-to afford the fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation systems needed to cultivate new high-yielding varieties. Spiraling debt burdens from such purchases have frequently left peasants with no other choice than to sell their farms to wealthy landowners, thereby reviving large-scale plantation agriculture systems typical of the early modern era. 107 Additionally, reliance on fertilizer-intensive farming has led to eutrophication of aquatic ecosystems. Eutrophication occurs when the runoff of nitrogen and phosphorus from fertilized land stimulates the rapid growth of algae and surface plants, such as water hyacinth. The death and subsequent decomposition of this vegetation consumes dissolved oxygen and causes fish kills. Eventually it creates oxygen-depleted environments, such as the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. As these examples suggest, the Green Revolutions of the past two centuries have left a decidedly mixed legacy. 108 OPPORTUNISTIC SUBSTITUTIONS HAVE LONG characterized the shifting terrain of modern agriculture. Nitrates displaced guano in the late 1870s, and chemically synthesized ammonia supplanted sodium nitrate in the 1930s. Similarly, transpacific debt peonage offered a viable surrogate for transatlantic chattel slavery during the Age of Abolition, while more recent iterations of industrial food production rely upon vast reserve armies of migrant laborers whose legions exist in the penumbra of national citizenship. Such acts of "creative destruction"-economist Joseph Schumpeter's oft-repeated phrase-continue to test the limits of the biosphere and challenge the margins of human tolerance. 109 Prior to World War II, South American fertilizer provided an indispensable infusion of nutrients into European and North American soils. This transfer of resources from the Southern to the Northern Hemisphere also laid the groundwork for the input-intensive "second" Green Revolution. For the first time in world history, farmers began relying upon commercially produced fertilizers shipped in bags from distant locations. As Henri Lefebvre claimed in The Production of Space, the commodification of natural resources exemplifies one of the central environmental "displacements" of capitalism, namely that "those commodities which were formerly abundant because they occurred 'naturally,' which had no value because they were not products, have now become rare, and so acquired value. They have now to be produced, and consequently they come to have not only a use value but also an exchange value. Such commodities are 'elemental' not least in the sense that they are indeed 'elements.' " 110 This elemental commodification depended upon the ex-"Black Atlantic." The Pacific has seen many Middle Passages, each with radically different trajectories and destinations. 114 Even so, the coerced movement of workers offers a structural framework for historical studies of the region. Pairing the nineteenth-century Chinese labor migration to Latin America with the mass relocations of workers from Chile, Bolivia, and Peru to the Norte Grande generates a unique perspective from which to reflect upon the myriad human and ecological reorganizations of the Pacific world over the past two centuries. Further research may reveal that the experiences of Melanesian indentured workers who toiled on Australia's sugar plantations from the 1860s onward, the bonded Japanese laborers who landed on Hawaiian shores during the 1880s, and the Chilean debt peons who served their bosses in the icy streams of Gold Rush California have much in common with those of the Chinese guano diggers and Andean nitrate miners whose labor subsidized the First Green Revolution. 115 In addition to this scarcity of scholarship on the Pacific world, inattention to the structural changes inaugurated by the guano and nitrate trades results from a relentless portrayal of modern agriculture as a realm of miracles. In the Spring 1992 issue of Agricultural History, former secretary of agriculture Orville L. Freeman claimed, "It is not exaggerating to describe U.S. agricultural productivity as the greatest production miracle in the history of mankind." 116 Likewise, Norman Borlaug anticipated "Feeding a World of 10 Billion People: The Miracle Ahead." 117 The scholarly literature is replete with agricultural "miracles" that have allegedly occurred in such disparate places as China, Hungary, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, and Paraguay. 118 Never in history has the extraordinary seemed so resolutely mundane.
While it is true that unforeseen advances in agricultural yields have consistently thwarted the apocalyptic prophecies of famine forecasters-from Thomas Malthus (An Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798) to Paul R. Ehrlich (The Population Bomb, 1968)-the depiction of these exploits as quasi-magical escapes from disaster has also served to conceal the social and environmental contexts in which such paradigm shifts occur. Additionally, it has masked the very real inequalities and material dislocations created by such transitions. Miracles are supernatural events, which cannot be attributed to human agency or the forces of non-human nature. Historians have a significant role to play in demystifying agricultural transitions and the labor regimes that propelled them. 119 Whether changing the nitrogen cycle with widespread applications of excavated and synthetic fertilizers or amplifying atmospheric carbon concentrations through the combustion of fossil fuels, humans have been altering the earth's elemental flows for many generations. In 2000, as "global warming" headlined discussions of our planetary future, Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen coined the term "Anthropocene" to signify the current epoch of geological time, in which Homo sapiens has come to exert an unprecedented influence on the cycles of the elements upon which all life depends. The Anthropocene requires a different mode of historicizing. By transcending "the artificial but time-honored distinction between natural and human histories," notes Dipesh Chakrabarty, "climate scientists posit that the human being has become something much larger than the simple biological agent that he or she always has been. Humans now wield a geological force." 120 Evaluating the ways in which humans have acquired geological "agency" will involve a heightened awareness of how we have labored to modify our most literal foundation, the soil. As recently as 2003, J. R. McNeill remarked upon the longstanding scholarly inattention to the history of human interactions with terra firma: "It seems curious that the earth itself should not absorb much attention from environmental historians." 121 A multilayered understanding of these fundamental transformations of the earth as an integrated social and natural system will also require a synthesis of the synoptic overview with the vantage point of matters on the ground. There are no "miracles" in agricultural history, nor are there any easy solutions to the quandaries of global food production in a warmer, more populous world. In the words of Bertolt Brecht, . . . it takes a lot of things to change the world: Anger and tenacity. Science and imagination, The quick initiative, the long reflection, The cold patience and the infinite perseverance, The understanding of the particular case and the understanding of the ensemble: Only the lessons of reality can teach us to transform reality. 
